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SOCIAL W4ELFARE: CONTEXT FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
Phyllis J. Day
Purdue University
ABSTRACT
Because human service professionals are uncritical concerning the latent
functions of their organizations they may be unaware of their power as agents for
social control. The paper discusses values, attitudes, and education supportive
of such control, the permeation of social programs into heretofore private areas
of human life, the power inherent in new techniques of social persuasion, and the
centralization of that power because of expanded government funding and accounta-
bility requirements. As public assistance programs contain civil disorder among
the poor, so other social welfare programs insure conformity and control the
alienated of all levels of society.
Introduction
The traditional model of social welfare is that of a benign society offering
aid to the less fortunate through the good works of human service professionals.
Although we may no longer be idealistic about the planned beneficence of our
society's structures and institutions, we are still unlikely to think of social
welfare organizations as control mechanisms, or social workers as "soft cops"
(Goroff, 1977). Perhaps because of the somewhat hallowed grounds of good
intentions upon which social work is based, and our faith in the concept of
"public good," we do not look at the underlying functions of the system. Our
beliefs preclude awareness of the permeation of our lives by this ever-expanding
institution and its latent functions for control.
Social control here does not simply refer to the normal regulatory processes
of a complex and interdependent society. Society itself, in which the members
define the normative boundaries by which they can live together, demands mechanisms
for insuring certain standards of behavior, and these norms, roles, and expecta-
tions which are the bases for socialization allow us to live and work together more
or less harmoniously. Our concern with social control for purposes of this paper
has to do with more pernicious control, especially that hidden in the latent
functions of social welfare practices. This control regulates aspects of personal
life and, on the basis of decisions in which those being regulated have little
opportunity for participation, impose a demand for order which maintains both
systemic social inequalities and an unquestioning conformity to society.
With the exception of work with involuntary clients, such as in the criminal
justice system or with people with severe behavior disorders, we do not ordinarily
see social work as controlling. To consider family service or community mental
health agencies, Boy Scouts or United Way in this manner may seem strange indeed.
Moreover, social workers are generally unaware of the extent of their control.
Most people enter the human service field from feelings of caring, wanting to help,
to serve--to love. Perlman says
This is what the human services in all their forms are for--
to meet human needs in ways that deepen and fulfill the sense
of social caring and responsibility between fellow human
beings (1979:54).
It is unlikely, therefore, that we see ourselves as intermediaries for control or
question the purposes or sources of that control.
We take the position here that most if not all social agencies control far
more efficiently than we in the profession of social work realize. Moreover, there
are two aspects to this. The first is that those members of society who are parti-
cularly disadvantaged by social inequalities bear the heaviest burden of control,
since they already deviate from mainstream American society in many ways--poverty,
being of non-white ethnicity, single mothers and dependent children, for examples.
The second is the expansion of governmentally funded and controlled services into
areas of life heretofore not considered amenable to such intervention. This latter
has multiple effects. In addition to assuring systemic inequalities for the dis-
advantaged, it fosters conformity and its corollaries: unquestioning attitudes
about society and less tolerance for deviance for self or others. Next, it reifies
definitions of deviance, for the government requires standard "facts" for accounta-
bility. Further, through expanding programs for those already considered deviant,
it subjects more people to more sophisticated techniques of reporting. Finally, it
expands definitions of deviance in competition for more funding, and takes those
definitions across socioeconomic lines.
As technology frees more people to enter service professions, as more govern-
ment money is invested in programs to "solve" social problems, and as social welfare
organizations permeate society even more-from work to worship, from instruction
in child care to coping with dying--we must look closely at social work as social
control. Otherwise we become agents of that control, supporting and legitimating
it, in a managed society.
Perspectives on Control
Throughout history, as the institution of social welfare developed, there have
been two major elements within it. The first and most obvious is the humanitarian
one--helping people in need, doing good for whatever altruistic or personal benefits
were derived. The second is less obvious. Historically it is clear that political
support for programs to aid those in need has come only at times when other systems,
political contraints, and economic realities have required it (Piven and Cloward,
1971). This was true whether the intent was to keep people within prescribed areas
to work for the economic gain of others (Statute of Laborers, 1349, and more recent
county general assistance laws), to contain civil disorder initiated by the dis-
advantaged (as, the War on Poverty, 1965), or to insure that workers and the public
at large would not become so alienated from the inauthentic demands of present-day
society as to undermine the forces which keep society at status quo (expansion of
Community Mental Health Acts).
These two historic elements are tied together in the profession of social
work, where a large number of people are supported with public funds and legiti-
mation for "doing good." Those eager to serve, help, or reform have accepted
support for the sake of their own good works. Whether they are unaware of the
political implications of that support or if they deliberately choose to use it in
the service of their own objectives matters little in terms of the control it
fosters. Even our definitions of social problems push us into a subtle trap. Rule
suggests that we have defined certain situations and behaviors as "social problems"
when in reality they are political conflicts. We thereby imply that by applying
our expert knowledge the problems can be solved, and we ignore their causative
political bases. He says that
Social problem-solving... is a profoundly political enterprise
... and its ideology is none the less important for being con-
cealed... [this] may unfortunately lead people to believe that
the politics have somehow been taken out of policy... this vision
is dangerous because of the prospect that a government desperate
to cool off brewing social conflicts and a community of pro-
fessionals hungry for recognition may find it an irresistible
vehicle (Rule, 1978:23-26).
Thus, we legitimate a false reality and aid in concealment of need for conflict
solutions. In doing so we may claim the neutrality of objectivity, but in conflict
situations where there is uneven distribution of power, neutrality favors the more
powerful. To understand the work we do, we must define social problems as poli-
tical problems (Goroff, 1977), and consider social work to be political action.
Through this, we may be able to determine for whom our altruism is at work.
Public Monies and Expanding Programs
Until about 1960, most human services were limited by costs, availability, and
stigma for users to emergency types of assistance--economic, medical, psychiatric,
and so forth. Piven and Cloward (1971) note the financial measures taken to control
the civil disorders and disruptions of the sixties. Their analysis deals primarily
with expansion of financial welfare services to quiet and coopt the poor. However,
implications extend to those who, though not poor, were politically alienated
during the sixties. It provides through extrapolation a rationale for expansion
of programs other than financial which were offered to maintain people in or return
the alienated to mainstream American belief and behavior.
This new alienation was the result of a growing awareness among many people of
the inauthenticity of American values as they applied to economic resources, the
politics of scarcity, systemic inequalities for non-white persons, women, and others,
and international politics. Though many of the poor were among those so alienated,
programs for poverty alone could not quell the political unrest. This called for
a different kind of control, which came through such programs as the community
mental health movement with its expanded definitions of "mental illness" and the
idea of a "right" to mental health. Programs of this sort, added and expanded
through massive input of government funds, cannot be demonstrated to have quieted
the alienated or to have returned them to middle-class values. Nonetheless, the
latent functions of such expanded programs evidence themselves in present-day
social and political quietus and an apparent retrenchment to values apparent before
the 1960 disruptions.
Among the forces of legitimation for the mental health movement, in addition
to pressures from the social work profession for expansion and massive federal
funding, was mass media advertising. Stivers says
The helping professions and their agencies and organizations,
most of which are state-supported, sell their services to the
public. Advertising against alcoholism, drug addiction, and
mental illness, as well as advertising in favor of seeking
"professional" help for almost every problem are presented as
public service messages on radio and television...(1977:388).
This is not to deny the usefulness of the programs nor the altruistic nature of
those working in them. Rather, it notes their latent functions--public intrusion
into private lives, expanding definitions of deviance, and new pressures for and
legitimation of conformity. Stivers continues
As society becomes more rigidly organized, new kinds of behavior
become a threat to that increased organization.... This fact
is not grasped simply by an examination of the number of social
control agents and the increased efficiency of their intervention
techniques.. .but rather by the incursion of treatment into areas
of people's lives previously untouched...(1977:388).
New kinds of behavior manifested from alienation included, for example, the
women's movement, which had implications for the breakdown of family life, tradition-
al sex role expectations, and relationships between parents and children. New pro-
grams to strengthen family life, to increase parent-child communication, to provide
child care at places of employment, and to deal with the stresses of work are some
of the results. The proliferation of such new information and techniques, and
their availability to those who wish to use them, are very positive. In fact, in
many ways, it is time that society assumed responsibility for many of these problems.
However, it is also time that we become aware of more far-reaching results than the
immediate service. To use only one example, consider the benefits of day care for
children of working mothers, a program highly encouraged by the women's movement.
True, it may free some women, particularly those not in poverty, from dependence,
and provide them with self-fulfilling and creative activity. It also ensures more
people in the labor force, a benefit not only to the women but to the employer, and
this is particularly problematic for displaced homemakers, women without education
and training who can only work in low wage jobs, and so forth. It may perpetuate
inequalities for those already disadvantaged as only one latent function.
Also, what of the children placed in day care, and particularly those which are
state-supported for families dependent on AFDC money? Are those children provided
all the benefits of a creative and mind-expanding center, such as we have the
knowledge and resources to provide? Is freedom given so as to ensure movement
toward fulfillment of potential and curiosity? Or is the day care center at worst
a warehouse and at best another agency teaching the values of conformity, the joys
of non-deviance? These are the questions we must ask--the balance of benefit should
go to people who are being served, if our ethical stance as a profession means any-
thing. Without being aware of the latent functions of such programs, that stance
in fact can mean very little.
Furthermore, it is naive to assume that regulations regarding funding contracts
have no bearing on the kinds of services available to clients, or the limitations
on those services in scope and quality. Often, in search of funding for survival,
organizations jump on fad bandwagons, extending domains in response to a constit-
uency of government or special interest groups rather than to client needs. The
proliferation of programs along certain lines--child abuse, law enforcement,
community mental health--may give more total services but may neglect whole areas
of need while placing greater numbers at risk in terms of surveillance, reporting,
diagnoses of deviance, and processing through court or state systems.
Dimensions of Control
Within the "society-set" of government as beneficent and social work as the
action arm of this beneficence there are certain broad dimensions of control.
Among these are attitudes and values of social workers, the social work education
process, and the organizational setting and technology of social work. In techno-
logy are included models of intervention, definitions of deviance and diagnoses,
recording and reporting, and the use of sophisticated information systems and
evaluative techniques.
1. Values and Attitudes
The initial value orientation of most people entering the profession is prob-
ably humanitarian--a desire to help, to aid the unfortunate, to learn skills for
service to others. However, this orientation is translated through belief systems,
backgrounds, and contending values in each person. Brill points out the dicho-
tomies that exist in our societal value system.
We hold that all people are equal, but that those who do not
work are less equal.... We hold that individual life has worth,
but that only the fit should survive. We believe that we are
responsible for each other, but that those who are dependent
upon others for their living are of lesser worth (1978:12).
She says further that effective workers must be aware of themselves as walking
value systems, be conscious of what those values are, evaluate them rationally, and
change those which are not rational (14-15). Unfortunately, because values are so
closely connected to self-concept, real change is not easily achieved through the
educational process.
It is difficult to admit that, where helping is the goal, power is an issue.
Yet this is a major value problem. Regardless of the reason for intervention, a
superior-subordinate relationship is inherent in the situation.
Frequently there is an ideology of paternalism and non-
reciprocity permeating... social service institutions. The
inequality in power and authority reflected in the vertical
relationship parading as a professional relationship (Goroff,
1977:3).
The organization itself is a symbol of society's power, and it legitimizes social
work expertise and denotes the client's status in seeking help. The worker is the
expert, and the client comes to the service as petitioner.
Even the value of "wanting to help the less fortunate," the reason expressed
by many for choosing social work as a career, is a power statement. It implies
that clients lack something, and need to be brought up to our, or society's,
levels or standards of functioning. Though wanting to help, in pure form, is the
basis of human service work, we must not consider our clients as somehow less than
whole persons whom we, as experts and whole persons, have the ability, knowledge,
and the right to round out, remake, fulfill, or "pull up" to our level. The fact
that there is a "right way" which the expert knows and a "wrong way" which the
client does underlies and colors the whole intervention process. Even laying out
alternatives may be problematic, for the worker, because of his/her beliefs and
values, may choose to express only those most viable from personal perspectives.
The client, of course, is likely to follow expert advice because of the power
concepts behind it.
Values about social work as a loving profession have control ramifications
also. Somehow we may feel that because what we do is inspired by love it can have
only beneficial effects. This view can deny clients the objective technology and
empathetic responses they need to take action against their problems. Moreover,
this kind of love has within it a possessiveness which may burden clients in
another way. It is difficult to care about a client who does not, in exchange,
show appreciation or gratitude. Where "love" is the service, gratitude may be the
price. Lack of this coin of return is often defined by the worker as resistance,
aggression, or unwillingness to participate. So-called client recalcitrance,
which may in fact be a positive attempt at assertiveness, may then negatively
influence the entire course of intervention.
From the opposite angle, however, many practitioners who realize the importance
of objectivity and technology have almost removed themselves from a caring relation-
ship with clients, except as a philosophical stance. They know that love is not
enough, but go to the other extreme, where technology is all-important. It may
become an exercise in client manipulation--as examples, some kinds of behavior
modification, certain kinds of esoteric group therapy techniques, or techniques
made so routine as to become "recipes" to effect certain changes. The result here
is dehumanization for both client and worker, for the establishment of relation-
ship--a loving and caring interplay between helper and client-is, according to
Perlman, the heart of helping. It is
... human response to human need in any problem situation...
to not recognize the need for and importance of relationship
is to negate humanism, and to dehumanize those desperately in
need of this essential bonding force in human life (1979:22-23).
In either of the extremes, the worker has control and power, and may use it for
his/her own gratification and/or purposes to the detriment of client rights and
needs. Intervention may become an action upon the client rather than in service of
the client.
Though there are other controlling values deserving of note, such as sexism,
racism, prejudice for the nuclear family, and so forth, the last to be considered
here is that of social class. This has two major parameters. The first is that
most social workers come from middle-class backgrounds, and some have only recently
attained to that status through hard work and determination. They often believe
in and reflect those values of work, education, -perceptions of family life, deviance,
and so forth. Attitudes toward and treatment of the client may demand that those
values be adopted rather than they be assessed to determine their relevance to
the client's interests and needs. Secondly, social class values seem often to
include beliefs about the poor and others labeled deviant which assume that they
have deliberately chosen deviance and refuse to aspire to middle American beliefs.
These ideas, of course, are belied by such studies as done by Goodwin (1972),
Kallen and Miller (1971), Burch (1974), and others.
The effects of social class values pervade the practice of social work. For
example, Grimm and Orten find that negative student attitudes toward the poor may
not be neutralized by graduate social work education, and specifically note that
professional education must be geared to correct this (1973). Briar (1961)
empirically demonstrates that middle class clients are viewed more positively than
are lower class clients, and Fischer and Miller (1973) find significant social
class effects that consistently favor middle class clients. Friedman and Berg
note evidence to demonstrate that "...a social class bias is present in mental
health professionals and that it works to the detriment of the lower class client"
(1978:47).
That report also shows that workers' social class origins are critical
variables in determining how clients will be viewed, particularly in combination
with variables concerning clients' socioeconomic class. It suggests that social
class biases are not a phenomena unique to clinicians coming from certain classes
but have a halo effect on judgments made by all clinicians (45-51). Finally, in a
study on job preferences of graduate social workers, Day et al. (1976) find a
marked dispreference for working in organizations for the poor. Though this may
be due in part to the nature of bureaucracies serving the poor or the lack of
clinical practice possible there, the movement of such workers away from poverty
agencies is clear.
2. Social Work Education
Though in social work education the value base of practice has major emphasis,
there is little indication that students are taught, or can be taught, values. Whole
sections of beginning texts deal with values (see Piccard, 1978; Morales and
Sheafor, 1977; Brill, 1978; among others). Yet even when students begin their
educations with positive values toward clients they may lose them in the educational
process. Varley finds, for example, major shifts of values while in schools of
social work for students. Most of these shifts are not in the expected or desired
direction (in Koerin, 1977:87).
One of the values apparently reinforced in some schools is that of adherence
to the organization. Goroff finds, in a study of 200 students, that they come to
school with either an individualistic (pro-client) or a bureaucratic orientation.
Upon graduation, the bureaucrats' orientation had not changed, and more than 80% of
the others had changed to a bureaucratic orientation. The remaining were seen by
peers and faculty as "different" (1977:6-7). The idea that being graduated without
a bureaucratic orientation is to be seen as different is perhaps the most trouble-
some aspect of the study. Although it is surely necessary to learn to practice
within the constraints of an organization, those must be recognized as constraints
rather than as proper bounds for service. Despite social work values, it appears
that as educators we may be imparting values oriented to the bureaucracy, to the
social worker as "organization man," and to a non-individualistic attitude toward
clients.
One of the major emphases in social work education is the importance of the
diagnostic or medical model of interpersonal practice--the idea is that people
have individual pathologies rather than having problems many of which are responses
to "other-system" pressures. Despite research demonstrating the adverse effects
of labeling and its lack of utility to the client (Wood, 1978:437-458), we persist
in teaching this model. Davis and Stivers point out that labeling has as much to
do with controlling normative behavior as with the reality of "emotional" or
"mental" illness. They present the following quote by a mental health professional
defining schizophrenia (Cameron, 1963:587, in Davis and Stivers, 1978:80-81) and
follow it with their normative interpretation:
After a steady downward course, the decline may come to
a halt at some relatively low level of adaptation. Here the
patient often lives an idle, ineffectual, and apparently meaning-
less life. If his level of adaptation is very low, or his
behavior too unpredictable, he may require permanent insti-
tutional care. If not, he may lounge about the house or the
neighborhood as an irresponsible idler, or wander aimlessly
from place to place as a vagrant.
The simple schizophrenic is often an irresponsible idler
(moral judgment) who is apathetic and does not live up to his
potential (maladjusted, as it is normal to want to get ahead)
and may become a vagrant (legal category). In short the simple
schizophrenic is not normal, is immoral, and might even he a
petty criminal. His major offenses would appear to be laziness
and indifference....
3. Organization and Technology
Technologies are the techniques or tools by which a profession carries out the
actions which will achieve the goals of its work. It has been said that human
services are part science and part art, but a clearer statement is that they are
...neither a science nor an art, but a technology trying to
achieve controlled changes in natural relationships via rela-
tively standardized procedures which are scientifically based
(Jaffe, 1978:381).
Saleeby and Hunter note that "...the need for technologies is obvious, but their
development in a moral vacuum is dangerous..." (1977:62). Because technology has
become so vastly important in legitimating the professional nature of social work,
it may often be carried out without realization of the moral issues involved.
Stivers puts it succinctly--
The end of technique is efficiency and order, and its use
in human affairs results in the adjustment of man to his
environment. Technique is the realm wherein means become
ends and facts become values.... The rationality of technique
involves the reduction of the spontaneous to logic, to method
...when the still non-technical dimensions of human life come
into contact with technique, they become subject to it ....
The final result is a technical civilization originally set in
motion to free man but which in turn has enslaved him (1975:
378-379).
An example of this is the medical model with its use of labeling, as mentioned above.
It is considered professional, useful, and legitimate by most social agencies.
Therefore, social workers willingly perpetuate the control inherent in the practice.
That is their job.
The first technique addressed here has to do with therapeutic techniques of
counseling, and the second with organization--the necessities of bureaucratization
and the techniques of gathering, assessing, cumulating, storing, and retreiving
data. These latter operations are becoming more common and more legitimate in
social agencies both because of the availability and ease of data processing tech-
niques, and governmental requirements for accountability in the use of public funds.
1) Technologies of Persuasion
Stivers says
All of the techniques of human intervention are ideologically
defended as in man's best interest, to help him adjust and
conform, often in ways in which he is led to feel that he
is expressing his individuality: underlying such techniques
are the assumptions of and preference for a basic compatibility
if not total synthesis of man and society (1975:387).
The reasoned perception by theorists and social workers of non-conforming people
as pathological, the proliferation of organizations to "help" them to conform, and
the overwhelming message given through mass media and socializing institutions in
support of non-deviance through mental health leave little room for those who do
not "fit in." Worse, not "fitting in," being harmlessly different, is often seen
as deviance by the people so labeled. Convinced of the necessity to conform,
worried that their natural reactions to stress are "emotional instabilities,"
confused by their alienation to a society which promises so much, they hasten to
be "redone," cured by the social experts. They become more stressed when they can-
not meet the expectations of those people who "know" what good behavior and good
emotions are, and may be lost as whole persons in the process of diagnosis,
labeling, treatment, and conformation. Though there are surely some people who, for
whatever reasons, cannot cope with problems alone, this number is probably minimal
in comparison with the number of people processed by social agencies.
Any human service intervention has inherent within it elements of power and
dependency, and therefore involves social persuasion. Whether that intervention
be the state as parens patriae removing a child from its natural parents, the AFDC
program granting financial assistance, or therapeutic counseling to help hold a
marriage together, the client comes to the relationship as dependent petitioner.
Indeed the act of seeking help, admitting to dependence or loss of personal power,
is prerequisite to intervention. Such dependence, as necessary as it may be,
lends a vulnerability on the part of the client that enhances the use of power
and therefore control.
In some cases, particularly those which deal with programs for the poor, such
control is matter-of-fact, taken for granted. We are well aware of the class
inequities represented in both criminal and juvenile justice systems. In the first,
the system supports the illusion that crime is the product of a small group of
personally dangerous criminals who come primarily from the lower socioeconomic class.
This focuses attention away from the social, financial, and personal costs of
offenses of people in white-collar crime and corporate manipulation. In the second,
where the system was originally intended to protect children rather than punish
them, most rights of due process, though guaranteed by law, have been in practice
removed from children and their families (Sarri, 1974). In both adult and juvenile
justice systems, it is evident that the majority of those apprehended, tried, con-
victed, and incarcerated (or whatever euphemisms may be used for juvenile justice)
are poor and non-white (Sarri, 1974:65).
Control is more subtle in other agencies. While we may be aware of the dis-
cretionary power of AFDC to control family budgets or remove children from the
home "for their own good," few of us consider that public assistance programs are
also normative controls which maintain marriage and sex role expectations. Depend-
ence and sexual "morality" for women are assured by surveillance for "suitability
of home" and discretionary use of programs. For men, harsh requirements for eligi-
bility and for continued assistance revolve around attachment to the work force
even when disabilities or economic conditions prevent their employment (Day, 1979).
Beyond those agencies which have overt control, many are available for people
who have not yet done anything "wrong." They offer help to remain "right" according
to so-called middle class values--the nuclear family, the supporting father and wife
and mother roles for women, individual achievement through education and work, the
correct way to bring up children, and so on. There are two reasons why it is
difficult to criticize such organizations as Boy and Girl Scouts, Family Services,
Mental Health Agencies, or recreational organizations. The first is that, along
with such institutions as schools and churches, they are engaged in protecting
society and its people by teaching normative standards. The second, however, is
that they also teach not to question or criticize the functions of society and its
norms. While they stress achievement they may also teach derogation of those who do
not achieve, and the importance of monetary reward--if something does not have a
computable economic value it may not be worth having, -or being, or doing. While
they help with marriage or job adjustment, they may place societally imposed limits
on individual freedom. And so on--for every positive function, there may he one
which is negative. As workers, we must recognize our responsibility for both, but
as we also have been taught, we may not perceive the latent functions or know how
to criticize them.
It is unlikely that most social agencies aim at control per se. Yet the tech-
niques exist for control and are used throughout the social welfare institution to
some degree. These techniques range from interpersonally oriented therapies such
as empathy, modelling, gestalt, or psychoanalytical techniques, for example, through
those which involve use of mood-altering drugs, hypnosis, or behavior modification.
Moreover, in addition to conscious learning and/or problem-solving, other learning
may take place which obviates volition and enhances reliance on external controls.
Even the most beneficent therapy is based on scientific knowledge of methods which
... analyze traditional types of rewards, such as money,
esteem, approval, and status, and discover which are most
efficient in which circumstances. Such knowledge produces
a powerful tool, a truly scientific method of social control...
(Partridge, 1978:143).
Add to this that clients learn that some other agent is responsible for behavior
and for happiness--the therapist, drugs, hypnosis, society--and there is even more
vulnerability for social control.
Throughout even our most benign agencies runs the underlying theme of con-
formity and an emphasis which teaches that to question authority, whether at the
personal or political level, is not to be tolerated in ourselves or in others.
Conformity to the status quo, as we are taught, has both political and economic
ramifications. For example, one of the obvious aspects of community political
economy is the conduct of business of United Way. The organization effectively
controls by finances the scope and kinds of programs offered by member agencies.
It is in turn controlled by business and organizational interests of the community,
and we may be sure of the attention paid to conservatism, to maintenance of the
status quo, to providing primarily middle class services, and to the promotion of
business interests (Chernow, 1978:15-18).
To not know how to perceive that there are problems in our society, or to be
unable to question why that society is inauthentic for so many, is a bitter thing.
It affects us personally, the groups of which we are a part or care about, and the
nation as a whole. We must recognize that our social agencies have a part in
helping people to be lock-stepped in place--gently, lovingly--but lock-stepped
none the less.
2) The Computer Never Forgets
Much of the software of human services cannot be categorized, nor should it be.
The uniquity of each individual and the ramifications of his/her problems, the
creation of a relationship, the judgments and choices involved in that relationship,
all militate against classification, categorization, and quantification. Yet in-
creased government funding and the competition for it, require program evaluation,
and the easiest kind of evaluation is counting the numbers of people served. Since
the long-range effects of human service programs are difficult to assess, organi-
zational procedures turn to an easier evaluation. Once in the organizational habit
of assessing quantity, quality becomes secondary. It is, of course, essential
that we be held accountable for expenditure of public monies. Nevertheless,
dehumanization and loss of attention to quality can be the real effects of such
accountability.
In speaking of the systems approach so widely used today, Hoos says
So enticing has been the prospect of a "social balance sheet"
however, that social scientists, who should know better, and
bureaucrats and politicians, who cannot be expected to know
better, have allowed themselves to overlook the shortcomings
and inadequacies of the systems approach (Hoos, 1972:78).
Practitioners in social work should know even better, perhaps. Unfortunately,
once the substitution emphasizing quantity becomes part of agency process, it may
be difficult to re-include components of quality and effectiveness.
The problems posed by wider cumulation of data must also be considered.
There is a movement now from computer systems to interlocking networks of computers.
Recording and reporting techniques are sophisticated enough that
To the degree that coordination becomes a reality...to the
degree that records are kept accurately, the ability of an
individual to "forget" and be "forgotten" becomes less
possible (Berry, 1975:358).
In the past, community-wide client registers were eliminated because of the danger
of intrusion into client privacy they presented. Today we have a much more
accurate and speedy type of client information system, and because it is a new
technology practitioners are delighted rather than concerned.
This computer based network allows scores of community
mental health centers and state hospitals to feed clinical
data on individual patients into one central facility
(Laska, 1975:315).
This not only permits a "client treatment package," it lends itself to surveillance
of clients by any number of officials, for computer banks are easily accessed and
interlocked.
Moreover, some are beginning to see that such central information systems can
be used to forestall dysfunction by reducing rates of occurrence of particular
disorders in the population.
Data contained in the record, such as diagnosis, demography,
and location, aggregated for specified time periods, may
identify the distribution of behavioral disorders and possible
determinants... Demographic analysis of communities must be
interfaced with the demographic characteristics of populations
currently being served so that high-risk sub-groups.. .can be
identified, coordination of services enhanced, and community
well-being facilitated (Laska, 1975:32).
We already know who the populations at risk are, since social science has cata-
logued particular social problems as more likely to affect the poor, minority
groups, women, and other disadvantaged people. Those groups most likely to be
oppressed by systemic inequalities, and therefore alienated, are those who will
be even more subject to surveillance and "preventative measures." As we know,
the likely result of increasing programs is to increase reporting and the spiral
of labeling. Not only do more people become aware that they are deviant but they
go on record in the community as deviants. It is in the interest of the organi-
zation to expand its clientele, and
As more agencies.. .become members of networks.. .there is
improvement in detection systems as well as.. .an increased
viability in the definitions of deviance.... As the
definitions are more widely used and.. .more viable, the
need for treatment becomes prominent in the mind of the
public. These definitions, because of their official
nature, become methods by which individuals... carry with
them permanent or at least long term consequences (Berry,
1975:358).
If Stivers is right in saying that where technology impacts against humanity it
overwhelms it, the human services, their workers, and clients may all be lost
in dehumanization as technology rolls over social welfare.
Conclusion: The Political Economy of Social Welfare
The social welfare institution in America is huge. It entails large
bureaucracies at all levels of government and many private organizations closely
linked to each other and to the public sector through professional ties and funding
sources. It employs tousands, from case aides to highest level professionals. The
amount of money spent in services, programs, agency maintenance, and direct finan-
cial aid and services is enormous. We would be naive to believe that such an
enterprise has been undertaken as a "pure public good." First this assumes that
there is such a thing as pure public good, and secondly that there is agreement
among people as to what it is.
Moreover, to envision social welfare as having utility beyond mere good will,
as we must if we are to understand its enormity, we must assume that its utility
lies in service to other than clients. This is especially true given the level of
services provided to some. We postulate, therefore, that the utility, though
altruistic in part, derives more fully from the social control it offers, and the
support for systems and organizations which implement that control.
Looking at social welfare's political economy, we see on one level a real
financial input. There is, for example, social work employment, from university
professors studying deviance or teaching social work to the suppliers of food,
bedding, and equipment for institutions. Salaries and welfare payments input into
local economies, providing economic and social benefits beyond the "market power"
of individuals in aggregate. Certainly the maintenance of a low wage work force
and control of civil disorder as postulated by Piven and Cloward benefit local as
well as other economic systems (1971).
On another level, it is astute politically and economically to keep people in
conformity to certain ideals and beliefs, and to encourage them to doubt themselves
rather than to question inequalities and alienation from the wider system. By
thus defusing personal frustration into personal blame, social action against
problems is vitiated. By redefining conflict as social problem and putting us to
work at soluations, we have a semblance of action which accomplishes little but
maintains control. Social workers are implicated as middlemen in this, and we
need to know what interests we are forwarding with our good works. If there were
nothing to question about the American Way of Life we would not need to be concerned,
but as Stivers says
...the techniques of organization, treatment, and communi-
cation for the social control of deviant behavior are related
to other human techniques such as education, industrial re-
lations, and leisure. Taken together, they form a massive
attack on human individuality (1977:388).
Human service technology is inextricably hound to the growth of the thera-
peutic state, for it offers the methods by which control can be maintained.
The problem with the therapeutic state is its insatiable
desire to restructure our social and cultural environments
under the banners of prevention and rehabilitation both through
the cooptation of the potentially maladjusted at an earlier
and earlier age and the sponsorship of therapy for everyone....
The real issue is not the growth of the therapeutic state
but the growth of and centralization of power within the
state... (Stivers, 1975:389-390).
If we believe in a controlling elite in our society, and a study of the political
and economic systems surely make one tend toward that conclusion, then we must see
ourselves as agents of social control. Our human feelings as well as our techno-
logical talents are being used. Our own desires for increasingly potent techno-
logies in the service of others, our subjugation of idealism to the use of power,
are contributing to a society of control and conformity.
The discussion above has different implications for different sets of people.
For theorists it entails a scientific study of the practices of social welfare for
controlling functions, and a working partnership with social work practitioners in
understanding and use of such research. For educators and administrators in
schools and programs of social work, it requires a re-evaluation of the product
goals they may have for students. Client advocacy and the perpetuation or in-
stillation of positive client orientations and values appropriate to social action
are essential. Moreover, we must educate our students in the means and uses of
policy analysis at all levels of practice, and in a practical understanding of the
place of the social work professional in the complex organization.
For social work practitioners and their professional associations, there must
be continuing emphasis on latent as well as manifest functions of the organization,
its services, and its processes. Policy must become one of the most important
considerations in practice. Where it is detrimental to clients or is seen as
more beneficial to others, a professional position must be taken and upheld.
Awareness of social work as social control may not change the control. But
we need to realize that we are implicated in the controlling functions of an
inequitable society. We must at least know that. Those of us in the profession
because of a desire to find truth or from altruistic beliefs about human needs
and services need at least to look honestly at what we do with our good works,
negatively as well as positively. Given that, we may shed new light on both
theory and action on social problems, client problems, and social welfare as
social control.
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